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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
Justice Blackmun and Individual Rights
Diane P. Wood*
Of the many contributions Justice Blackmun has made to
American jurisprudence, surely his record in the area of individual
rights stands out for its importance. Throughout his career on the
Supreme Court, he has displayed concern for a wide variety of indi-
vidual and civil rights. He has rendered decisions on matters ranging
from the most personal interests in autonomy and freedom from in-
terference from government in life's private realms, to the increas-
ingly complex problems posed by discrimination based upon race,
sex, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, sexual orientation, and
other characteristics. As his views have become well known to the
public, both through the opinions he has authored and those he has
joined, he has become known as one of the leading "liberal" justices
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts - a fact which I believe has
caused him some amusement, given the initial publicity that greeted
his appointment to the Court. Nevertheless, if "liberal" here con-
notes an abiding concern for the individual, a desire both to keep
government in its place and to ensure that governmental actions fa-
cilitate individual development, and a vision of the equality of
human beings before the law, Justice Blackmun richly deserves the
* Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School.
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label.
One could not in the space of one short article canvass every-
thing Justice Blackmun has done in the field of individual rights.
Here, I have chosen to focus on the non-criminal areas relating to
individual autonomy and the right to be free from discrimination
(derived both from statutes and from the Constitution). The picture
that emerges is one of a hierarchy of rights, ranging from the most
highly protected against governmental restriction to those that are
more subject to democratic controls. It is at times a complex picture,
for Justice Blackmun insists on seeing the world in all its factual
disarray, and he resists the temptation to employ the simplifying as-
sumptions of abstract theory that might make his judging job easier.
He prefers the more difficult approach that is firmly grounded in the
facts of each case, knowing that in the long run this will produce the
most just results, as well as the soundest development of the law.
I. The Right To Be Let Alone
It is not just the notoriety of the Supreme Court's 1973 decision
in Roe v. Wade that causes me to place the 'right to be let alone" at
the top of Justice Blackmun's hierarchy.' In fact, Justice Blackmun's
consistent position on the abortion issue over the twenty years that
Roe has been law, as well as his decisions on other so-called privacy
issues, suggests that the most sacred area of individual rights to him
is the one relating to the individual's personal autonomy - the right,
as he put it in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 "to be
let alone" (citing Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in Olmstead v.
United States3). In a sense, this is a pre-constitutional right that
does not and cannot depend on formal constitutional recognition
(which would imply that it could be removed in the same manner).
Individuals are free from some intimate forms of governmental in-
trusion simply by virtue of their humanity.
The Justice freely acknowledged in Roe v. Wade that "[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."' How-
ever, he noted also that in a line of decisions going back to the late
nineteenth century, the Court had "recognized that a right of per-
sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution."5 This does not mean that the
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), decided with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
2. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986).
3. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. at 152.
5. Id.
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Constitution created the privacy right, in the same way that it cre-
ated the House of Representatives or the Sixth Amendment require-
ment of juries in criminal trials. Instead, the opinion offers two possi-
ble avenues of constitutional recognition, as it states the key holding
of the Court:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court deter-
mined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Put another way, Justice Blackmun articulated in Roe, and the
many cases that followed, the important insight that a core set of
individual rights exists that neither the states nor the federal govern-
ment may trample, no matter how much due process they may use.7
The explosive public debate that followed Roe conveniently dis-
regarded several important points about the decision. First, by ignor-
ing Roe's focus on the woman's right to choose whether or not to
complete her pregnancy, abortion opponents gave little or no thought
to the many positive steps they might take that would help both
pregnant woman and potential life alike: steps including better ac-
cess to contraception (which obviously avoids the dilemma in the
first place, and helps to ensure that children when born are cher-
ished), social acceptance of unmarried pregnant women (thus reduc-
ing the stigma of an unwanted pregnancy), and widespread and inex-
pensive day care for young children (so that motherhood would not
mean the economic end of a woman's life). Second, Roe was imme-
diately accused of requiring "abortion on demand," in plain contra-
diction to the opinion's careful attention to the increasing interest
the state has in the developing fetus throughout a pregnancy, and
the complex balancing between the mother's interests and those of
the fetus that Roe discusses.
In this rhetorical atmosphere, it was predictable that the limits
of the right recognized in Roe would be tested. They were. In 1975,
the Court considered the validity of a Virginia statute that made it a
misdemeanor "by the sale or circulation of any publication, to en-
6. 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
7. Those who have argued against this idea often dismiss hypothetical rules, such as
state-ordered marriage, state-compelled sterilization, state restrictions on the race or religion
of acceptable marriage partners, or adoptive children, that would arguably violate it as "things
that just wouldn't happen here." Unfortunately, both history and contemporary precedent
around the world indicate that this assumption about human behavior is too optimistic.
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courage or prompt the procuring of an abortion."" Justice Blackmun,
writing for the same seven-person majority that had decided Roe,
held that the Virginia courts had erred in assuming that commercial
speech was entitled to no First Amendment protection. The majority
further held that it would violate the appellant's First Amendment
rights to apply the statute to his advertisement for abortion services
in New York.9
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court in the 1975 decision
of Connecticut v. Menillo overturned a Connecticut ruling that held
a state statute invalid which criminalized an attempted abortion.
The lower court had applied the law to a person who was not a phy-
sician and who had never had any medical training. 10 Roe, the Court
pointed out per curiam, had not gone so far; indeed, its rationale
supported the continued enforceability of criminal abortion statutes
against nonphysicians, insofar as it balanced the risks during the first
trimester of an abortion done by a physician against the risks of nor-
mal childbirth.
It was not long, however, before many state legislatures began a
kind of war of attrition against Roe v. Wade. Typical of the statutes
passed was the one considered in Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth," which required (1) the woman to certify in
writing her consent to the procedure, (2) consent of the spouse, (3)
parental consent for pregnant minors, (4) prohibition of the use of a
certain technique of abortion after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy,
(5) recordkeeping requirements, and (6) standards of care for the
aborted fetus. Again writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun upheld
the written consent and recordkeeping requirements, and struck
down the more onerous spousal consent, parental consent, and care
and technique requirements.
These kinds of issues regularly returned to the Court, in a line
of cases including Colautti v. Franklin,12 Bellotti v. Baird,3 Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,14
8. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
9. Id. at 825, 829. Bigelow also gave new libe to the protection of commercial speech in
general under the First Amendment - a subject beyond the scope of this article.
10. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
11. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
12. 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (standard of care for physician when fetus "may be viable").
13. Two phases: first, 428 U.S. 132 (1975) (parental consent); second, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (parental consent with alternative of judicial approval following parental notification).
14. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (informing woman about medical assistance and father's re-
sponsibility for child support; required information from physician about dtrimental physical
and psychological risks; reporting requirements; degree of care for postviability abortions; re-
quired second physician).
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,15 Hodgson v. Minnesota,"
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, and, finally, the
1991 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey. 8 It is enough here to say that, beginning with Webster, the
rights secured by Roe and reaffirmed for many years had become
increasingly circumscribed. In many ways, the most significant re-
strictions were economic in nature. The Court in 1977 had drasti-
cally cut back on the right to choose for indigent women, when it
upheld a variety of funding and public facility restrictions in Beal v.
Doe,19 Maher v. Roe,20 and Poelker v. Doe,"1 all over Justice Black-
mun's dissents. It reinforced these rulings in Harris v. McRae,2 2
which upheld the so-called Hyde Amendment basically prohibiting
all federal funding of abortions. Between the funding cases, which
had converted Roe into a commitment to allow non-indigent women
to make decisions about their pregnancies, and the restrictions ap-
proved in Webster, the original 1973 concept had become severely
attenuated.
A large part of the reason for this was political. Roe v. Wade
had become an issue of central importance to the Republican Party
in the presidential elections of 1980, 1984, and 1988. Many believed
that the justices appointed to the Court during those years were
waiting for the first opportunity to overrule Roe once and for all.
Thus, when Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter supported a
more modest version of Roe in their joint opinion in Casey, Justice
Blackmun both appreciated the significance of their commitment to
"individual liberty and the force of stare decisis."'23 Yet, with an-
other presidential election underway, it was plain for all to see that a
change of one more vote could mean the end not only of Roe but of
the entire vision of individual autonomy upon which it rested. In lan-
guage uncharacteristically frank for Supreme Court opinions, Justice
Blackmun wrote:
15. 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989) (legislative "findings" on beginning of human life; required
viability tests for 20 week fetus; prohibition on use of public facilities; prohibition on use of
public funds).
16. 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990) (48-hour waiting period; two parent consent requirement
with judicial bypass).
17. 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (parental notice, judicial bypass).
18. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (informed consent; 24-hour waiting period; parental consent;
reporting and recordkeeping constitutional; spousal consent unconstitutional).
19. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
20. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
21. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
22. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
23. 112 S.Ct. at 2844.
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I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever,
and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my suc-
cessor may well focus on the issue before us today. That, I re-
gret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds
[that of the Court majority and that of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas] will be made."'
No one will know how many voters heard these words, or were influ-
enced by them, in the 1992 election. Nonetheless, it seems clear that
the majority of Americans are committed to a constitutional struc-
ture in which their fundamental privacy rights and personal auton-
omy are assured. As time goes on, it has become increasingly clear
that these rights require protection in areas beyond the difficult and
controversial one of abortion. Here, too, Justice Blackmun has made
his mark.
In an area closely related to that of abortion, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of New York statute making it a crime
to sell or distribute any contraceptives to minors under the age of
sixteen, and for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to dis-
tribute contraceptives to persons sixteen and older, in Carey v. Popu-
lation Services International.5 Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court holding that regulations imposing a
burden on a decision as fundamental as whether to bear or beget a
child could be justified only by compelling state interests, and had to
be narrowly drawn to express only those interests. With typical real-
ism, Justice Blackmun was also part of the four-Justice plurality
which found that the prohibition on distribution to minors under six-
teen could not be justified as a regulation furthering the state's pol-
icy against "promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young," at
least in the absence of any evidence that banning contraceptives
might have the desired effect.
More recently, the Justice wrote eloquently of the right to be let
alone in Bowers v. Hardwick,26 in which the validity of the Georgia
sodomy statute was at issue. A majority of five upheld the law, com-
menting that the Constitution nowhere mentions a "right to engage
in homosexual sodomy." In dissent, Justice Blackmun recharacter-
ized the issue: could the law regulate the private, intimate sexual
practices of both homosexual and heterosexual consenting adults
alike (as it purported to do on its face), or does such a law violate
24. 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
25. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the personal privacy rights of the individuals concerned? As Justice -
Blackmun correctly understood, Bowers should have been an easy
case. Almost any case can be trivialized in the same way the major-
ity handled Bowers: does the Constitution protect the right to
purchase 3.2% beer?27 does it protect the right to attend the Univer-
sity of California at Davis Medical School?" does it include the
right to know the price of prescription drugs? 9 The fact that no
such clauses appear in the Constitution did not prevent the Court in
those cases from recognizing various types of constitutional protec-
tions that resulted in the specific consequences noted. In the same
way, Justice Blackmun understood that more was at stake in Bowers
than the particular private conduct in question, and that by protect-
ing the intimate conduct of some, we protect the individual auton-
omy of all.
Justice Blackmun demonstrated his concern for personal rights
in a family setting in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,30 which in-
volved an astonishing city ordinance that made it a crime for a
homeowner to have living with her a son, a grandson, and a second
grandson who was the cousin rather than the brother of the first. He
joined the plurality opinion written by Justice Powell, which reiter-
ated the principles underlying this area:
This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
... A host of cases ...have consistently acknowledged a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."3' 1
Whether it is the abortion issue of the 1970's and 1980's, the issue
concerning the definition of "family" of the 1960's and 1970's, or the
many difficult questions that lie on the horizon, posed by new tech-
nologies of in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, prolongation of life
through technical means," or others unimagined now, the principleof individual privacy, dignity, and autonomy for which Justice
27. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,-
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
31. Id. at 499.
32. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841
(1990) (dealing with the right of legal guardians to order termination of medical treatment for
individual in persistent vegetative state), and opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Justice Black-
mun, id. at 2863, arguing for the right of the individual and the guardian to decide this diffi-
cult issue.
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Blackmun has stood will stand at the top of the list of civil rights
protected against governmental interference absent the most compel-
ling justifications.
II. Race
Almost equally high on the hierarchy of civil rights that Justice
Blackmun has protected stands the right to be free from race dis-
crimination, both in the conventional cases of actions that disadvan-
tage persons because of their race, and in the more difficult circum-
stances of affirmative efforts designed to erase the enduring effects of
the legacy of discrimination. From his earliest days on the Court, he
has displayed an unswerving commitment to the principle and the
promise of genuine equality for all.
October Term 1970 was the Justice's first full term on the
Court, and it had more than its share of landmark civil rights cases.
Among others, the Court handed down its decisions in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company,3 which banned employment tests that had a
racially discriminatory effect, if they were not sufficiently job-re-
lated; Griffin v. Breckenridge,"" which breathed new life into 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) by finding that it reached private conspiracies to
violate the civil rights of a defined class;35 and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education," which broke new ground on the
remedies available for the desegregation of school districts. In each
of these, Justice Blackmun joined the majority's opinions vindicating
the rights of the black plaintiffs.
It was not long before he authored some opinions for the Court
himself. In 1973, he wrote for the Court in Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Association,7 holding that a private club's ra-
cially discriminatory membership policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
The next year, he wrote for the Court in Gilmore v. City of Mont-
gomery, Alabama,8 striking down a city policy with respect to alleg-
edly private swimming pools that had the effect of creating segre-
gated enclaves and depriving blacks of access to parks and
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
35. Recently, a majority of the Court read Griffin narrowly, as it decided that § 1985(3)
did not afford protection to women seeking abortions from the organized violent behavior of
those seeking to prevent their access to clinics. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
113 S.Ct. 753 (1993). Justice Blackmun joined the dissenting opinions of both Justice Stevens,
id. at 779, and Justice O'Connor, id. at 799.
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
37. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
38. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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recreational facilities. In many subsequent cases, he either wrote or
joined opinions ensuring the vigorous and effective enforcement of
the constitutional and statutory prohibitions relating to race
discrimination.3 9
In many ways, however, the case that crystallized Justice Black-
mun's position on the problem of race discrimination (and inciden-
tally removed all doubt in the mind of the press about his liberal
credentials) was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,40
- the first genuine "affirmative action" case. Bakke involved the
constitutionality of a special admissions program adopted by the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which was
designed to assure the admission of a specified number of minority
students. The Court splintered badly in its decision, with two differ-
ent groups of five agreeing to the two main holdings: (1) that Bakke
had to be admitted to the Medical School, but that (2) it was wrong
to prohibit the school from taking race into account in its admissions
process. Justice Blackmun, with Justices White, Marshall, and Bren-
nan, agreed with the second point and would have reversed the first
point and held that the school was within its rights to deny admis-
sion to Bakke. The Justice joined Justice Brennan's opinion for those
four, but it is his own briefer separate opinion that commands our
attention here.
Citing the tiny percentage of minority doctors in the country,; he
wrote, "[i]f ways are not found to remedy that situation, the country
can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not race con-
scious." '41 This followed from the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its goal of complete equality. He frankly recognized
the tensions affirmative action creates, but he wrote:
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative
action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful.
39. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (per-
mitting action claiming racial discrimination in housing policies); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (permitting individual discrimination claim); Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (permitting Title VII action after private arbitration);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (concurring in the judgment that back
pay should normally accompany a finding of unlawful discrimination, but stating that the em-
ployer's good faith ought to be a "very relevant factor" in fashioning an affirmative remedial
order); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (dissenting from Court decision striking down a
lower court order designed to remedy police mistreatment of minority citizens); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private, commer-
cial, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students solely on the basis
that they were black); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (uphold-
ing housing discrimination complaint relating to the practice of racial steering).
40. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
41. Id. at 403.
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To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is
no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let
the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.42
Justice Blackmun took a similar approach to the question raised
in United Steelworkers v. Weber,4" whether Title VII prohibits all
private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. Voting
with the majority to uphold the plan, and thus to reject Weber's
Title VII attack on it, he wrote separately of his misgivings and of
the "practical and equitable" considerations supporting the Court's
result. Given the broad remedial purpose of Title VII, it should not
be construed to foreclose private affirmative efforts to redress the ef-
fects of segregation. In addition, noting as always the particular
facts, the Justice cited the moderate, temporary nature of the pro-
gram, and the ability of Congress to correct any mistakes in statu-
tory interpretation."
Justice Blackmun has consistently supported the same kinds of
measured, voluntary affirmative action programs in other contexts,
sometimes with majorities, sometimes in dissent. The cases include
Fullilove v. Klutznick,4" Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts,4" Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,4" Local 28 v
EEOC,48 Local 93 v. City of Cleveland,49 and United States v. Para-
dise.5 0 The general point that emerges from the record is clear:
42. Id. at 407.
43. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
44. Id. at 216.
45. 448 U.S. 448, 517 (1980) (joining opinion of Marshall, J., concurring in the judg-
ment that upheld the constitutionality of the 10% minority set-aside provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977).
46. 467 U.S. 561, 593 (1984) (dissenting from a Court opinion that struck down an
injunction to effectuate the terms of an earlier consent decree designed to redress racial
discrimination).
47. 476 U.S. 267, 295 (1986) (joining Justice Marshall's dissent from Court holding
that a school board's policy of extending preferential protection against layoffs to minority
teachers violated the 14th Amendment).
48. 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (joining Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority in holding
that the district court properly used statistical evidence in evaluating a union's membership
policies, and that certain measures were properly taken to supervise the court's orders, and
joining Justice Brennan's opinion for the plurality in holding that Title VII does not prohibit a
court from ordering affirmative, race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination).
49. 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (joining Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court holding that
Title VII did not preclude the entry of a consent decree that might benefit individuals who
were not actual victims of the employer's discriminatory practices, and that voluntary actions
to eradicate race discrimination might include reasonable race-conscious measures).
50. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (joining Justice Brennan's plurality opinion concluding that
even under a strict scrutiny analysis, the one-black-for-one-white promotion requirement im-
posed by the District Court for the Alabama Department of Public Safety was permissible
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through good times and bad, in the majority, the plurality, and in
dissent, Justice Blackmun has done his utmost to enforce the consti-
tutional and statutory commands against race discrimination, and
for a truly equal society.
III. Sex Discrimination
Although there can be no doubt about the Justice's commitment
to the principle of legal equality between the sexes, given among
other things his positions in the abortion cases, this is an area where
he has acknowledged a greater role for governmental response to ac-
tual differences. Perhaps he has been ahead of his time: it is interest-
ing to note that feminist scholarship has moved in a similar direc-
tion. 51 In the late 1960's and early to mid-1970's, its emphasis was
on formal equality, but as time has gone on, feminist theory has
moved beyond this to a more complex undertaking to identify the
special needs of women without at the same time returning to the
protective or repressive stereotypes of earlier eras.52
Shortly after Justice Blackmun joined the Court, then-Chief
Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court in Reed v. Reed,5 strik-
ing down an Idaho statute that mandated a preference for males as
potential estate administrators. Rather than subjecting that state law
to the lenient "rational basis" standard normally used to assess eco-
nomic legislation, Reed demanded a "fair and substantial relation-
ship" between the statutory goal and the means used to achieve it
(here, of course, the gender-based classification). It found the prefer-
ence for males to be wanting.
In 1975, the same kind of issue returned to the Court in Stan-
ton v. Stanton,5 which involved a Utah law specifying eighteen as
the age of majority for females, and 21 for males. This time Justice
Blackmun wrote for the Court. Notably, he found it unnecessary to
decide whether a classification based on sex is inherently suspect:
precisely the position he had taken in Frontiero v. Richardson,5 5 in
under the Equal Protection Clause).
51. For an excellent collection of articles that document these changes, see Symposium,
Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism, 1989 Univ. of Chicago Legal Forum,
and the opening article, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the
Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, id. at 9.
52. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. COURT
REV. 201.
53. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977) (reiterating
the holding of Stanton I).
55. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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which he refused to join an opinion by Justice Brennan so classifying
gender, and instead joined Justice Powell's opinion concurring in the
judgment. Instead, in Stanton, the Justice found Reed to be control-
ling. Acknowledging that Utah might have relied on facts such as
the earlier biological maturity of girls, he nonetheless condemned the
classification for its irrational reliance on old stereotypes, and for its
failure to recognize that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely
for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the
marketplace and the world of ideas. '5 Thus, avoiding the strait-
jacket of the "suspect classification," Justice Blackmun nonetheless
imposed a high standard of justification on legislative distinctions
based on sex.
The Court's opinion in Craig v. Boren5 7 carried on with the
Reed/Stanton analysis, as it invalidated an Oklahoma law prohibit-
ing the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen. Again demonstrating caution, the
Justice joined the opinion except insofar as it held that the operation
of the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the operation of the
equal protection clause; he did agree, however, that the Twenty-first
Amendment did not save the Oklahoma statute in question.58 In the
same Term, he voted with the majority in Dothard v. Rawlinson to
uphold an Alabama regulation establishing gender criteria for prison
guards in "contact" positions in maximum-security prisons, on the
ground that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
under Title VII for these positions.59
The Justice's unwillingness to disregard objective differences be-
tween men and women is easily observable in his positions in the
various insurance cases the Court has heard, including General Elec-
tric v. Gilbert,6" City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and
Power v. Manhart,61 and Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris.6
In Gilbert, he joined the Court's opinion holding that the exclusion
of disability due to pregnancy from a benefits plan did not violate
Title VII in itself, while carefully leaving open the possibility of an
56. 421 U.S. at 14-15.
57. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58. Id. at 204-210 (Part I.D), 214 (opinion of Blackmun, J., concurring in part). The
opinion of the Court also disapproved the earlier decision in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948), both on equal protection and Twenty-first Amendment grounds. Justice Blackmun's
reservation may also have covered this statement.
59. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
60. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
61. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
62. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
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effects-based theory.6 3 Gilbert was later legislatively overruled by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.64 In Manhart, however, he
joined a Court judgment finding a requirement of greater pension
contributions for women to be in violation of Title VII. With typical
scrupulousness, he pointed out the tension between the Manhart
holding and the General Electric holding in his separate opinion. He
concluded that he could accept a restriction on the scope of the ear-
lier decision, given that the only issue was one of statutory construc-
tion. Later, in Norris, it was Justice Blackmun's turn to read prece-
dents narrowly, as he would have confined Manhart to its facts and
would have upheld differences in retirement benefits according to
sex-based actuarial tables.65
In a group of cases including Orr v. Orr,66 Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Court, 7 and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,8 Jus-
tice Blackmun has supported legislation or positions designed to as-
sist women. In Orr, which held that alimony obligations could not
vary according to sex, he reiterated his support in a concurring opin-
ion for the holding of Kahn v. Shevin, 9 in which the Court had up-
held more generous payments for widows than for widowers. In
Michael M, he concurred in the judgment of the majority that the
California statutory rape law should be upheld over an equal protec-
tion challenge, while offering the following pointed comment:
It is gratifying that the plurality recognizes that "[a]t the risk of
stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies . . . have increased
dramatically over the last two decades" and "have significant
social, medical and economic consequences for both the mother
and her child, and the State." There have been times when I
have wondered whether the Court was capable of this percep-
tion, particularly when it has struggled with the different but not
63. See supra note 61. The key holding of the Court, which was that a distinction based
upon pregnancy was not a "sex-based" distinction, caused an outburst of laughter in the court-
room the day that the Gilbert decision was announced, suggesting perhaps that this was an
area where a dose of common sense would have helped the judicial process.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA specifies that sex discrimination includes discrimi-
nation on the basis of pregnancy. In 1987, Justice Blackmun joined the opinions by Justice
Marshall for the Court in part and for a plurality in part, holding that the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act did not pre-empt state legislation extending special benefits to pregnant workers
(namely, the right to a pregnancy leave with reinstatement to the same or a comparable job
afterwards). California Federal Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
65. 463 U.S. at 1095 (joining opinion of Powell, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
66. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
67. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
68. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
69. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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unrelated problems that attend abortion issues.7 0
The absolute prohibition of sexual intercourse with underage women
was a constitutionally acceptable way for the state to address these
issues.
In Hogan, the Justice displayed a similar willingness to allow
state regulation, when he dissented from the Court's condemnation
of a state-supported single sex (all-female) school of nursing,
writing:
I have come to suspect that it is easy to go too far with rigid
rules in this area of claimed sex discrimination, and to lose -
indeed destroy - values that mean much to some people by for-
bidding the State to offer them a choice while not depriving
others of an alternative choice."
The Equal Protection Clause does not, he continued, require "need-
less conformity."
Nonetheless, thanks again to his careful attention to both facts
and legal doctrine, and to his underlying respect for individual au-
tonomy, Justice Blackmun had no trouble understanding and thus
invalidating the so-called fetal vulnerability policy of the Johnson
Controls Company. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trolSj 2 he authored the Court's opinion rejecting a company policy
to exclude all fertile female employees from certain jobs due to the
risk to fetal development of exposure to dangerous substances (there,
principally lead). Neither the business necessity justification nor the
BFOQ exception to Title VII could save this kind of sex-based em-
ployment criterion. With full disclosure of the risks, women could
judge for themselves whether or not to accept such jobs.
IV. Other Areas
So many other cases have also raised questions about individual
rights that it is difficult to draw the line for this article. The Justice
has decided cases involving the rights of aliens, whom he has pro-
tected with the same vigor as he has other racial and ethnic groups;7 3
70. 450 U.S. at 481-82.
71. 458 U.S. at 734.
72. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
73. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See also Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (Jews may state a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982); St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (person of Arabian ancestry
HeinOnline  -- 97 Dick. L. Rev. 434 1992-1993
JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
the rights of illegitimate children and their parents, where he has
recognized a variety of possible legitimate state interests; 74 the rights
of the disabled, where he has generally deferred to statutory levels of
protection; 75 and age discrimination, where he again has relied heav-
ily on statutory guidance.7 1 In all these, as in the three areas ex-
amined here in detail, several general themes emerge.
First, when the core values of privacy and family arise, Justice
Blackmun holds legislation up to the most exacting scrutiny.
Second, when the characteristic in question is "immutable," in
the Carolene Products sense, Justice Blackmun demands a compel-
ling state interest before it can be upheld against constitutional
challenge.
Third, when common sense tells him that the distinction at issue
may be genuine - for example, only women get pregnant; actuarial
may be protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
74. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (Justice Blackmun with the majority
opinion upholding a Louisiana law barring illegitimate children from sharing equally in an
intestate father's estate with the legitimate children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 659
(1972) (Justice Blackmun joining Chief Justice Burger's dissent to the Court opinion holding
that a state statute denying an unwed father a hearing on his parental qualifications violated
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976) (upholding provisions of the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain
illegitimate children for surviving child's insurance benefits upon special showing); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 276 (1978) (concurring in the judgment on the ground that Labine should
be followed). On the other side, see Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361 (1979) (objecting to
a ruling upholding a Georgia statute under which the father of a deceased illegitimate child
was required to pursue statutory legitimization proceedings as a condition of suing for wrong-
ful death, but not a mother); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 297 (1979) (joining dissenting
opinion in case upholding federal regulations denying mother's insurance benefits to the
mother of an illegitimate child who never married the wage earner).
75. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (rejecting claim under Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 that a state Medicaid rule change would have an unlawful disproportionate
impact on the disabled); Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (joining
plurality opinion that held, inter alia, that a hospital's withholding of treatment from a handi-
capped infant when consent for treatment had not been given by the parents did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act); School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (joining
opinion finding that tuberculosis and similar contagious diseases could be a handicap within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 552 (1988) (opin-
ion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and objecting to the majority's "irrebuttable pre-
sumption" about the willfulness of primary alcoholism, because the Rehabilitation Act was
designed to eliminate such presumptions). Note, however, that in City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985), Justice Blackmun joined Justice Mar-
shall's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which applied a higher level of scru-
tiny to a municipal zoning ordinance that disadvantaged the mentally retarded.
76. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (Congress did not violate Equal Protec-
tion Clause by requiring retirement at age 60 of Foreign Service officers); Western Air Lines
v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (statutory violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act to require flight engineers and pilots to retire at 60 without strong justification);
TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 1 I1 (1985) (transfer policy based on age of pilot violated ADEA;
no BFOQ shown). In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765 (1979), Justice Black-
mun specifically referred to the remedial nature of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and the need to construe it liberally.
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studies consistently reveal differences between general male and fe-
male experience; minors often require special treatment - he is will-
ing to listen carefully to the justification offered to support it. Even
so, he will reject classifications based on generalized assumptions,
simple convenience, or the like.
Fourth, throughout the area of individual rights, the Justice has
paid close attention to the source of the right in question. Positions
he is willing to take in statutory cases may not be identical to his
constitutional interpretations. As the type of right asserted moves
farther from the privacy and autonomy interests of the individual,
and the right not to be disadvantaged because of immutable charac-
teristics, he recognizes greater and greater freedom for the legisla-
ture to choose the required degree of protection.
V. Conclusion
Coming from the State of Minnesota, with its traditions that
combine a strong sense of individualism with an equally strong sense
of social responsibility, Justice Blackmun has been one of the leading
voices for individual rights on the Supreme Court for the last
twenty-three years. He has respected democratic institutions without
ever forgetting that the Court stands as the final guardian of human
rights for each person in our society. It is a record of which we all
can be proud - a record in which we all have shared, and will con-
tinue to share in the future.
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